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Abstract
We study the problem of checking for the existence
of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of
polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs.
The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonneg-
ative rational weights on incoming edges from players
who picked the same strategy augmented by a fixed in-
teger bonus for picking a given strategy. These games
capture the idea of coordination within a local neigh-
bourhood in the absence of globally common strategies.
We study the decision problem of checking whether a
given set of strategy choices for a subset of the players
is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, al-
ternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We identify
the most natural tractable cases and show NP or coNP-
completness of these problems already for unweighted
DAGs.
1 Introduction
Identifying subclasses of games where equilibria is
tractable is an important problem in algorithmic anal-
ysis of multiplayer games. Pure Nash equilibria (NEs)
may not exist in games and checking whether a game
has a pure NE is in general a hard problem. Even for
subclasses of games in which a pure NE is guaranteed
to exists (for instance, potential games) computing one
remains PLS-hard (Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Tal-
war 2004). Although, Nash’s theorem guarantees the
existence of mixed strategy NE in all finite games, com-
puting one is still a hard problem. Therefore, identify-
ing restricted classes of games where equilibrium com-
putation is tractable and also precisely identifying the
borderline between tractability and hardness in such
restricted classes is of obvious interest. In this pa-
per, we study the borderline of tractability in a nat-
ural subclass of games where the utilities of players are
restricted to be pairwise separable. These are called
polymatrix games (Janovskaya 1968) and they form an
abstract model that is useful to analyse strategic be-
haviour of players in games formed via pairwise interac-
tions. In polymatrix games, the payoff for each player
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is the sum of the payoffs he gets from individual two
player games he plays against every other player. Poly-
matrix games are well-studied in the literature and in-
clude game classes with good computational properties
like the two-player zero-sum games. They also have
applications in areas such as artificial neural networks
(Miller and Zucker 1991) and machine learning (Erdem
and Pelillo 2012).
In terms of tractability, the restriction to pairwise
interactions does not immediately ensure the existence
of efficient algorithms. Computing a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-complete (Cai and
Daskalakis 2011) and checking for the existence of a
pure NE is NP-complete in general. This motivates the
need to further analyse the type of pairwise interac-
tions that would ensure tractability. In this paper, we
argue that another important factor which influences
tractability is the structure of the underlying interac-
tion graph and presence of individual preferences (that
we call bonuses).
The main restriction that we impose on polymatrix
games is that each pairwise interaction form a coordi-
nation game. Henceforth, we will refer to these games
simply as coordination games on graphs. Coordination
games are often used in game theory to model situa-
tions where players attain maximum payoff when they
agree on a common strategy. The game model that
we study, extends coordination games to the network
setting where payoffs need not always be symmetric
and players coordinate within a certain local neighbour-
hood. The neighbourhood structure is specified by a fi-
nite directed graph whose nodes correspond to the play-
ers. Each player chooses a colour from a set of available
colours. The payoff of a player is the sum of weights on
the edges from players who choose the same colour and
a fixed bonus for picking that particular colour. This
game model is closely related to various well-studied
classes of games. For instance, coordination games
on graphs are graphical games (Kearns, Littman, and
Singh 2001) and they are also related to hedonic games
(Dreze and Greenberg 1980; Bogomolnaia and Jackson
2002). In hedonic games, the payoff of each player de-
pends solely on the set of players that selected the same
strategy. The coalition formation property inherent to
coordination games on graphs make the game model
relevant to cluster analysis. The problem of cluster-
ing has been studied from a game theoretic perspective
for instance in (Feldman, Lewin-Eytan, and Naor 2012;
Pelillo and Buló 2014). Feldman and Friedler (2015)
introduced a framework for the analysis of clustering
games on networks where the underlying coalition for-
mation graph is undirected and, as a result, a poten-
tial game. Hoefer (2007) also studied clustering games
that are polymatrix games based on undirected graphs
where each player has the same set of strategies. These
games are also potential games.
Coordination games on graphs constitute a game
model which can be useful for analysing the adoption
of a product or service within a network of agents in-
teracting with each other in their local neighbourhoods.
For example, consider the selection of a mobile phone
operator. The interaction between users can be repre-
sented by a coordination game where the weight of the
edge from i to j represents the total cost of calls from j
to i. Also, the bonus function can represent individual
preferences of users over the providers. Now suppose
that mobile network operators allow free calls among
its users. Then each mobile phone user faces a strate-
gic choice of picking an operator that maximises his cost
savings or, in the case of unweighted graphs, maximises
the number of people he can call for free. If players are
allowed to freely switch their operator based on their
friends’ choices, then the stable market states corre-
spond to pure Nash equilibria in this game. One can
observe similar interactions in peer-to-peer networks,
social networks and photo sharing platforms.
A similar game model based on undirected graphs
was introduced in (Apt et al. 2014) and further stud-
ied in (Rahn and Schäfer 2015). The transition from
undirected to directed graphs drastically changes the
status of the games. For instance, in the case of undi-
rected graphs, coordination games are potential games
whereas in the directed case, Nash equilibria may not
even exist. Moreover, the problem of determining the
existence of pure NEs is NP-complete for coordination
games on directed graphs (Apt, Simon, and Wojtczak
2016). However, pure NE always exists for several nat-
ural classes of graphs (Simon and Wojtczak 2016).
However, in many practical situations, finding just
one pure Nash equilibrium may not be enough. In fact,
there can be exponentially many Nash equilibria, each
with a different payoff to each player (see Example 2).
Ideally, we would like to ask for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium satisfying some given constraints. In this
paper, we focus on checking whether a partial strategy
profile (i.e. strategy choices for a subset of the players)
is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alter-
natively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We will refer to
these as ∃NE and ∀NE decision problem, respectively.
We identify the most natural tractable cases and show
NP or coNP-completness of these problems already for
unweighted DAGs.
Related work. The complexity of checking for the
existence of pure Nash equilibria in a game crucially
depends on the representation of the game. Normal
form representation can be exponential in the num-
ber of players whereas graphical games and polymatrix
games provide a more concise representation of strategic
form games. While checking for the existence of pure
Nash equilibria can be solved in LogSpace for games
in normal form, it is NP-complete for graphical games
even when the payoff of each player depends only on the
strategy choices of at most three other players (Gott-
lob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005). On the other hand, it is
solvable in polynomial time for graphical games whose
dependency graph has a bounded treewidth (Gottlob,
Greco, and Scarcello 2005) or when each player has
only two possible strategies (Thomas and van Leeuwen
2015). For polymatrix games, checking for the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete even when
all its individual 2-player games are win-loss ones (Apt,
Simon, and Wojtczak 2016).
Gilboa and Zelmel (1989) were the first to study
the computational complexity of decision problems for
mixed Nash equilibria with additional constraints for
two player games in normal form. For many natural
constraints the corresponding decision problems were
shown to be NP-hard. Further hardness results were
shown in (Conitzer and Sandholm 2008) and (Bilò and
Mavronicolas 2012). The existence of constrained pure
NE can be solved in LogSpace for normal form games
simply by checking every pure strategy profile. For
graphical games the problem is NP-hard even without
any constraints (Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello 2005),
but because of the special structure of our games, this
result does not directly apply in our setting. On the
other hand, constrained pure NE can be found in poly-
nomial time for graphical games played on graphs with
a bounded treewidth (Greco and Scarcello 2009). We
are not aware of any prior work on this problem for
polymatrix games. Our paper is the first to identify
several subclasses of polymatrix games for which the
existence problem of a constrainted Nash equilibrium
is tractable.
2 Background
A strategic game G = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) with
n > 1 players consists of a non-empty set Si of strate-
gies and a payoff function pi : S1 × · · · × Sn→R,
for each player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let S := S1 × · · · ×Sn
and let us call each element s ∈ S a joint strategy.
Given a joint strategy s, we denote by s(i) the strategy
of player i in s. We abbreviate the sequence (s(j))j 6=i
to s−i and occasionally write (s(i), s−i) instead of s.
We call a strategy s(i) of player i a best response to
a joint strategy s−i of his opponents if for all x ∈ Si,
pi(s(i), s−i) ≥ pi(x, s−i). We do not consider mixed
strategies in this paper.
Given two joint strategies s′ and s, we say that s′ is
a deviation of the player i from s if s−i = s
′
−i and
s(i) 6= s′(i). If in addition pi(s′) > pi(s), we say that
the deviation s′ from s is profitable for player i. We
call a joint strategy s a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
no player can profitably deviate from s. For any given
strategic game G, let NE(G) denote the set of all (pure)
Nash equilibria in G.
We now introduce the class of games we are interested
in. Fix a finite set of colours M . A weighted directed
graph (G,w) is a structure where G = (V,E) is a graph
without self loops over the vertices V = {1, . . . , n} and
w is a function that associates with each edge e ∈ E,
a nonnegative rational weight we ∈ Q≥0. We say that
a node j is a successor of the node i, and i is a pre-
decessor of j, if there is an edge i → j in E. Let
Ni denote the set of all predecessors of node i in the
graph G. By a colour assignment we mean a func-
tion that assigns to each node of G a finite non-empty
set of colours. A bonus is a function β that to each
node i and a colour c assigns an integer β(i, c).
Given a weighted graph (G,w), a colour assignment
C : V → 2M \{∅} and a bonus function β : V ×M → Z,
a strategic game G(G,w,C, β) is defined as follows:
• the players are the nodes;
• the set of strategies of player (node) i is the set of
colours C(i);
• the payoff function pi(s) :=
∑
j∈Ni: s(i)=s(j)
wj→i +
β(i, s(i)).
So each node simultaneously chooses a colour and
its payoff is the sum of the weights of the edges
from its neighbours that chose the same colour aug-
mented by a bonus to the node from choosing this
colour. We call these games coordination games
on directed graphs, from now on just coordination
games. When the weights of all the edges are 1, we
obtain a coordination game whose underlying graph is
unweighted. In this case, we simply drop the function
w from the description of the game. In this case the
payoff function is defined by pi(s) := |{j ∈ Ni | si =
sj}| + β(i, s(i)). Similarly if all the bonuses are 0, we
obtain a coordination game without bonuses. Likewise,
to denote this game we omit the function β. Note that
an edge with positive integer weight w can be simu-
lated by adding w nodes and 2w unweighted edges to
the game, and any positive integer bonus can be sim-
ulated similarly. However, if all weights and bonuses
are represented in binary, as we assume in this paper,
such an operation can increase the size of the graph
exponentially and be inefficient.
Example 1 Consider the unweighted directed graph
and the colour assignment depicted in Figure 1. Take
the joint strategy s that consists of the underlined
strategies. Then the payoffs are as follows: 0 for the
nodes 1, 7, 8, and 9; 1 for the nodes 2, 4, 5, and 6; 2
for the node 3.
Note that s is not a Nash equilibrium. For example,
node 1 can profitably deviate to colour a. In fact the
coordination game associated with this graph does not
have a Nash equilibrium. Note that for nodes 7, 8 and
9 the only option is to select the unique strategy in its
1 {a, b}
2 {a, c}3{b, c}
4 {a, b}
5 {a, c}
6{b, c}
7 {a}
8 {c}9{b}
Figure 1: Unweighted coordination game with no NE.
strategy set. The best response for nodes 4, 5 and 6
is to always select the same strategy as nodes 1, 2 and
3, respectively. Therefore, to show that the game does
not have a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to consider the
strategies of nodes 1, 2 and 3. We denote this by the
triple (s1, s2, s3). Below we list all such joint strategies
and we underline a strategy that is not a best response
to the choice of other players: (a, a, b), (a, a, c), (a, c, b),
(a, c, c), (b, a, b), (b, a, c), (b, c, b) and (b, c, c). ✷
Let Q ⊆ V be a nonempty subset of all the nodes of
a given graph G. A query is a function q : Q → M
which satisfies the following property: for all i ∈ Q,
q(i) ∈ C(i). We say that a query q is consistent with
a strategy profile s iff q = s|Q, i.e. q(i) = s(i) for all
i ∈ Q. We call a query q : Q → M monochromatic
if for all i, j ∈ Q, q(i) = q(j) and otherwise we call
the query polychromatic. A query q is said to be
singleton if |Q| = 1. Obviously every singleton query
is also a monochromatic one. In this paper, we study
the following decision questions.
Given a graph G = (V,E), weights w, colour assign-
ment C, bonus function β, and query q.
(∃NE problem) Is there a Nash equilibrium in
G(G,w,C, β) that is consistent with q?
(∀NE problem) Is every Nash equilibrium in
G(G,w,C, β) consistent with q?
Formally, ∃NE problem asks if there exists s ∈ NE(G)
such that q = s|Q, while the ∀NE problem asks whether
for all s ∈ NE(G) it is the case that q = s|Q. Note
that ∀NE is not a complement of ∃NE. Actually, any
non-singleton ∀NE query can be reduced to a series of
singleton ∀NE queries q|{i} for every player i ∈ Q. Note
that trivially ∃NE ∈ NP and ∀NE ∈ coNP, because
checking whether a joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium
and is consistent with q can be done in polynomial time.
Given a directed graph G and a set of nodes K, we
denote by G[K] the subgraph of G induced by K. A
(directed) graph G = (V,E) is a complete graph if
for all i, j ∈ V such that i 6= j, we have i → j ∈
E. That is from every node there is an edge to every
other node. Given the set of colours M , we say that
a directed graph G is colour complete (with respect
to a colour assignment C) if for every colour c ∈ M
each component of G[Vc] is a complete graph, where
Graph Class ∃NE ∀NE
2 colours+monochromatic query O(|G|) O(|G|)
2 colours+polychromatic query NP-comp. O(|G|)
DAGs+3 colours+singleton query NP-comp. coNP-comp.
simple cycles O(|G|) O(m · |G|)
DAGs with out-degree ≤ 1 O(|G|2.5) O(|G|2.5)
colour complete graphs no bonuses O(nm ·m!) O(nm ·m!)
Table 1: Summary of the results. The last two classes
are unweighted; a simple reduction from the Partition
problem and its complement, shows NP and coNP hard-
ness of their ∃NE and ∀NE problems, respectively, in
the weighted case.
Vc = {i ∈ V | c ∈ C(i)}. In particular, every complete
graph is colour complete, but not vice versa (see Figure
4 in the appendix).
Table 1 summarises our results in terms of the num-
ber of arithmetic operations needed. We use binary
representation for all values in w and β. The size of the
input game graph is |G| = O(nm + e), where n is the
number of nodes in a graph, m is the number of colours
and e is the number of edges.
Note that these graph classes can occur naturally in
practice. Graphs with two colours can model duopoly
markets and simple cycles are used in Token ring ar-
chitectures. Unweighted DAGs with out-degree ≤ 1
can model indirect elections such as the US primaries
where votes are cast for delegates, who may have their
own preferences, rather than for presidential nominees
directly. In this context, the ∃NE question answers who
can become the leader based on the list of candidates
each voter realisticly considers voting for (represented
by the set of available colours) and ∀NE can tell us if
a given candidate wins no matter how the undecided
voters (i.e. players with non-singleton set of available
colours) vote. Colour complete graphs can model situ-
ations where every user benefits as the number of users
increases even if they do not know each other directly,
e.g. users joining a torrent swarm. Also, in the con-
text of a market with multiple products, the ∃NE/∀NE
questions can tell us which product can/will dominate
the market in the end.
3 Graphs with Two or Three Colours
We start by studying coordination games with two
colours and monochromatic queries. To fix the nota-
tion, let G = (V,E) and the colour set be M = {0, 1}.
Let q be a monochromatic query. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume q(i) = 0 for all i ∈ Q, because
otherwise we can rename the colours. We show how to
deal with the ∃NE decision problem first.
Theorem 1 The ∃NE problem for coordination games
with two colours and monochromatic queries can be
solved in O(|G|) time using Algorithm 1.
Similarly, Algorithm 2 below solves the ∀NE problem
for monochromatic queries.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for ∃NE on arbi-
trary graphs with two colours and monochromatic
queries.
Input: A coordination game G((V,E), w, C, β) and
monochromatic query q : Q→M .
Output: YES if there exists a Nash equilibrium
consistent with q and NO otherwise.
1 for i ∈ V do
2 if 0 ∈ C(i) then s(i) = 0 else s(i) = 1
3 set S := {i | s(i) = 1}
4 while S 6= ∅ do
5 remove any element from S and assign it to i
6 for {j ∈ V | i→ j ∈ E} do
7 if s(j) = 0 and 1 ∈ C(j) and
pj((1, s−j)) > pj(s) then
8 s(j) = 1
9 add j to S
10 if ∀i∈Q s(i) = 0 return YES else return NO
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for ∀NE on arbi-
trary graphs with two colours and monochromatic
queries.
Input: A coordination game G((V,E), w, C, β) and
monochromatic query q : Q→M .
Output: YES if all Nash equilibria are consistent
with q and NO otherwise.
1 Lines 1-9 of Algorithm 1 where every 0 is replaced
by 1 and every 1 by 0.
2 if ∀i∈Q s(i) = 0 return YES else return NO
Theorem 2 The ∀NE problem for coordination games
with two colours and monochromatic queries can be
solved in O(|G|) time using Algorithm 2.
In fact, any polychromatic ∀NE query can be reduced
to two monochromatic ones and so we get the following.
Corollary 1 The ∀NE problem for coordination games
with two colours and polychromatic queries can be
solved in O(|G|) time.
However, we will show that even answering single-
ton ∀NE queries for unweighted DAGs is coNP-hard in
the presence of three colours and no bonuses. We first
analyse the following gadget.
Proposition 1 For any Nash equilibrium s in
D(X1, . . . , Xk, x;Y ) from Figure 2: (a) s(Y ) = x iff
∃i s(Xi) = x and (b) s(Y ) = ¬x iff ∀i s(Xi) = ¬x.
Using this gadget we are able to show the following.
Theorem 3 The ∀NE problem for singleton queries is
coNP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours
and no bonuses.
Proof. We reduce from the tautology problem for for-
mulae in 3-DNF form. Assume we are given a formula
φ = (a1 ∧ b1 ∧ c1) ∨ (a2 ∧ b2 ∧ c2) ∨ . . . ∨ (ak ∧ bk ∧ ck)
X1
{⊤,⊥}
X2
{⊤,⊥}
· · · Xk
{⊤,⊥} {x}
Y
{⊤,⊥}
k − 1
Figure 2: Gadget D(X1, . . . , Xk, x;Y ) where x ∈
{⊤,⊥}. Note that one edge has weight k − 1.
{⋆}
T
{⊤,⊥} {⊥}
F
{⊤,⊥} {⋆}
Φ
{⊤,⊥}
U{⊤, ⋆}
W{⊥, ⋆}
X{⊥, ⋆} Y {⊥, ⋆}
{⋆}
Z
{⊥, ⋆}
2
2
Figure 3: Gadget used in the coNP-hardness proof of ∀NE.
Edges with weight 2 can be simulated by unweighted ones.
with k clauses and n propositional variables x1, . . . , xn,
where each ai, bi, ci is a literal equal to xj or ¬xj for
some j. We will construct a coordination game Gφ of
size O(n+k) such that a particular singleton ∀NE query
is true for Gφ iff φ is a tautology.
First for every propositional variable xi there are four
nodes Xi, ¬Xi, Li, Li in Gφ, each with two possible
colours ⊤ or ⊥. We connect these four nodes using
gadgets D(Xi,¬Xi,⊤;Li) and D(Xi,¬Xi,⊥;Li). This
makes sure that in any Nash equilibrium, s, we have
s(Li) = ⊤ and s(Li) = ⊥ iff Xi and ¬Xi are assigned
different colours. Next, for every clause (ai ∧ bi ∧ ci) in
φ we add to the game graph Gφ node Ci. We use gad-
get D(ai, bi, ci,⊥;Ci) to connect literals with clauses,
where we identify each xi with Xi and each ¬xi with
¬Xi. Note that Proposition 1 implies that the colour
of Ci is ⊤ iff all nodes ai, bi, ci are assigned ⊤. We
add two nodes T and F to gather colours ⊤ and ⊥
from the Li and Li nodes. Also, we add an addi-
tional node Φ to gather the values of all the clauses.
We connect these using gadgets D(L1, . . . , Ln,⊥;T ),
D(L1, . . . , Ln,⊤;F ), and D(C1, . . . , Ck,⊤; Φ).
Now, we need to express that for every Nash equilib-
rium s: s(T ) = ⊤ and s(F ) = ⊥ implies that s(Φ) = ⊤.
For this we use the gadget from Figure 3. It includes
three nodes T, F,Φ that we already defined in Gφ. We
claim that ∀NE query q(Z) = ⋆ is true for Gφ iff Φ is a
tautology. (The full proof is in the appendix.) ✷
On the other hand, we can show that answering
polychromatic ∃NE queries is NP-hard for unweighted
DAGs even with two colours and no bonuses. The con-
struction is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 The ∃NE problem is NP-complete for un-
weighted DAGs with two colours and no bonuses.
Building on this we can show the following when
there are three colours to choose from.
Corollary 2 The ∃NE problem for singleton queries is
NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours
and no bonuses.
Note that we can also show NP/coNP-hardness for
DAGs with out-degree at most two, because we can
make arbitrary number of copies of any given node, e.g.
to make three copies i1, i2, i3 of node i we can add nodes
i′, i1, i2, i3 and edges i→ i1, i→ i′, i′ → i2, i′ → i3.
4 Simple Cycles
We consider here coordination games whose underlying
graph is a simple cycle. To fix the notation, suppose
that V = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} and the underlying graph is
0→ 1→ · · · → n−1→ 0. We assume that the counting
is done in cyclic order within {0, . . . , n − 1} using the
increment operation i⊕ 1 and the decrement operation
i⊖ 1. In particular, (n− 1)⊕ 1 = 0 and 0⊖ 1 = n− 1.
For i ∈ V , let Zi(w) = {c ∈ C(i) | β(i, c) + w ≥
β(i, c′) for all c′ ∈ C(i)} denote the set of colours avail-
able to player i with the bonus at most w below the
maximum one available to i. For every i ∈ V , define
Ai := Zi(0), i.e. all colours with the maximum bonus,
Bi := Zi(wi⊖1→i − 1), and Ci := Zi(wi⊖1→i). Obvi-
ously ∅ 6= Ai ⊆ Bi ⊆ Ci ⊆ C(i) for every i. It is quite
easy to see that in any NE player i can only select a
colour from Ci. Let us fix a query q : Q → M . In
this section, without loss of generality, we assume that
0 ∈ Q (if 0 6∈ Q, then we can always re-label the nodes
in the cycle).
Algorithm 3: ∃NE on a simple cycle
Input: A simple cycle on nodes {0, . . . , n− 1}, sets
Ai, Bi, Ci for i ∈ V , a query q : Q→M .
Output: YES if there exists a Nash equilibrium
consistent with q and NO otherwise.
1 Let X0 = {q(0)}.
2 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
3 if Xi 6⊆ Bi⊕1 then
4 Xi⊕1 = (Xi ∩ Ci⊕1) ∪Ai⊕1
5 else
6 Xi⊕1 = Xi
7 if i⊕ 1 ∈ Q then
8 if q(i⊕ 1) 6∈ Xi⊕1 then
9 return NO
10 else
11 Xi⊕1 = {q(i⊕ 1)}
12 return YES
Theorem 5 The ∃NE problem for simple cycles can be
solved in O(|G|) time.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for ∀NE on a simple cycle.
Input: A simple cycle on nodes {0, . . . , n− 1}, sets
Ai, Bi, Ci for i ∈ V , a query q : Q→M .
Output: YES if all NEs are consistent with q and
NO otherwise.
1 for c ∈M do
2 if Algo. 3 for q′ := {0→ c} returns NO then
3 continue with the next c
4 else
5 Consider Xi computed by Algo. 3 for q
′:
6 if exists i ∈ Q such that Xi 6= {q(i)} then
7 return NO
8 return YES
Proof. [sketch] We argue that Algorithm 3 solves the
∃NE problem for simple cycles. In other words, we
argue that given a simple cycle over the nodes V =
{0, . . . , n − 1} and a query q : Q → M , the output of
Algorithm 3 is YES iff there exists a Nash equilibrium
s∗ which is consistent with q. Suppose there exists a
Nash equilibrium s∗ which is consistent with q. We
can argue by induction on V that on termination of
Algorithm 3, for all i ∈ V , we have s∗(i) ∈ Xi.
Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 3 is
YES. From the definition, this implies that for all i ∈ V ,
Xi 6= ∅ and for all j ∈ Q: q(j) ∈ Xj (in fact,
Xj = {q(j)}). We define a Nash equilibrium s∗ as fol-
lows. First, let s∗(0) = q(0). Next we assign values to
s∗(i) starting at i = n− 1 and going down to i = 1 as
described below.
• If i ∈ Q then s∗(i) = q(i).
• If i 6∈ Q and Xi ⊆ Bi⊕1 then by Algorithm 3 we have
Xi = Xi⊕1. Let s
∗(i) = s∗(i⊕ 1).
• Assume i 6∈ Q andXi 6⊆ Bi⊕1. If s∗(i⊕1) ∈ Xi∩Ci⊕1
set s∗(i) = s∗(i⊕ 1). Otherwise s∗(i⊕ 1) ∈ Ai⊕1 and
we set s∗(i) to any element in Xi \Bi⊕1.
A proof that s∗ is a NE is in the appendix. ✷
Algo. 4 reduces the ∀NE problem to m ∃NE queries.
Theorem 6 The ∀NE problem for simple cycles (un-
weighted simple cycles) can be solved in O(m|G|) time
(respectively, O(|G|) time using Algorithm 7 in the ap-
pendix).
5 Colour Complete Graphs
We show that ∃NE and ∀NE problems can be solved in
polynomial time for coordination games G((V,E), C)
played on unweighted colour complete graphs with n
nodes and a fixed number of colours,m, and no bonuses.
Theorem 7 The ∃NE and ∀NE problems for un-
weighted colour complete graphs and no bonuses can be
solved in O(nm ·m!) time.
Proof. We claim that the set of total orders on the set
of colours induces a set of joint strategies which contains
the whole set NE(G). Specifically, every total order 
on M will be mapped to a joint strategy SP() as fol-
lows: assign to each player the highest colour available
to him according to the total order . Formally, for all
players i: SP()(i) = max C(i). For any Nash equi-
librium s let us define a relation ≻s⊆ M ×M : x ≻s y
iff there exists player i such that {x, y} ⊆ C(i) and
s(i) = x.
Lemma 1 The relation ≻s is acyclic, i.e. for all k ≥
2 there is no sequence of colours x1, . . . , xk such that
x1 ≻s x2 ≻s . . . ≻s xk ≻s x1.
Note Lemma 1 may fail when bonuses are introduced
into the game. We also need the following folk result.
Lemma 2 Any acyclic binary relation on a finite set
can be extended to a total oder.
For the relation ≻s let ∗s be a total order from
Lemma 2 such that ≻s ⊆ ∗s.
Lemma 3 For any Nash equilibrium s, SP(∗s) = s.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 we know that for every
Nash equilibrium s, there exists at least one total order
onM that induces it. Therefore, for ∃NE problem (∀NE
problem) it suffices to check for all possible total orders
 onM , whether the induced joint strategy SP(), is a
Nash equilibrium and if so, whether any (respectively,
all) of them is consistent with q. There are m! total
orders on M . Checking whether an induced strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium consistent with q takes
O(nm) time. This gives O(nm ·m!) in total. ✷
Note that there are coordination games on colour
complete graphs with one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the set of total orders on colours and the set
of all Nash equilibria (Example 2 in the appendix), and
so with exponentially many different NEs.
6 Directed Acyclic Graphs
In Section 3 we showed that the ∃NE and ∀NE prob-
lems are NP and coNP complete respectively even for
unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most two and no
bonuses. We now show that if the out-degree of each
node in an unweighted DAG is at most 1 (there are no
constraints on the in-degree of nodes) then these prob-
lems can be solved efficiently.
Theorem 8 Algorithm 5 solves the ∃NE problem for
unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most one in
O(|G|2.5) time.
Proof. [sketch] Intuitively, for each node, i, we compute
the set, X(i), of colours that can possibly be assigned
to i in any Nash equilibrium. Such a set is trivial to
compute for source nodes in G, and for the other nodes
it can be computed by constructing a suitable bipartite
graph based on the sets precomputed for all its neigh-
bours and running a matching algorithm. In lines 7-10
we remove colours that are dominated by others. We
need the following lemma.
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for ∃NE on unweighted
DAGs with out-degree ≤ 1.
Input: A coordination game G((V,E), C, β) and
query q : Q→M
Output: YES if there exists a Nash equilibrium
consistent with q and NO otherwise.
1 Topologically sort V into a sequence (i1, . . . , in).
2 for j := 1 . . . n do
3 X(ij) := ∅
4 Y := {X(k) | k → ij ∈ E}
5 for c ∈ C(ij) do
6 S := {Z ∈ Y | c ∈ Z}; C′ := C \ {c};
Y ′ := Y \ S;
7 if exists c′ ∈ C′ such that
|S|+ β(ij , c)− β(ij , c′) < 0 then
8 continue with the next c
9 while exists c′ ∈ C′ such that
|S|+ β(ij , c)− β(ij , c′) ≥ |Y ′| do
10 C′ := C′ \ {c′};
Y ′ := Y ′ \ {Z ∈ Y ′ | c′ ∈ Z}
11 Construct the following bipartite graph
G′ := (V ′ = (Y ′, {{c′} × {1, . . . , |S|+
β(ij , c)− β(ij , c′)} | c′ ∈ C′}), E′)
where Z → (c′, x) ∈ E′ iff c′ ∈ Z12
if the maximum bipartite matching in G′
has size |Y ′| then
13 add c to X(ij)
14 if ij ∈ Q then
15 if q(ij) 6∈ X(ij) return NO else
X(ij) := {q(ij)}
16 return YES
Lemma 4 If Algorithm 5 returns YES, then for all i ∈
V , for all c ∈ X(i), there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗
such that s∗i = c and for all j 6= i, s∗j ∈ X(j).
Now, if Algorithm 5 returns YES, then from the def-
inition, for all i ∈ V , Ai 6= ∅ and for all j ∈ P ,
Aj = {q(j)}. By Lemma 4 it follows that there exists a
Nash equilibrium s∗ which is consistent with q.
Conversely, suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium
s∗ which is consistent with q. Let θ = (i1, . . . , in) be the
topological ordering of V chosen in line 1 of Algorithm
5. We argue that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, s∗(ij) ∈ X(ij).
The claim follows easily for i1. Consider a node im and
suppose for all j < m, s∗(ij) ∈ X(ij). For c ∈ C,
let Nim(s
∗, c) = {ik ∈ Nim | s∗(ik) = c}. Since s∗ is
a Nash equilibrium, s∗(im) is a best response to the
choices made by all nodes ik ∈ Nim . This implies that
for all c 6= s∗im , |Nim(s∗, c)|+β(ij , c) ≤ |Nim(s∗, s∗im)|+
β(ij , s
∗
im
). Note that |S| ≥ |Nim(s∗, s∗im)| and so c is not
discarded in line 8. Also, it guarantees the existence of
a matching of size |Y ′| at line 12 and thus s∗(im) ∈
X(im).
We claim that if the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm is used
for each matching at line 11, then Algorithm 5 runs
in O(|G|2.5). First, for each node k, X(k) is in Y at
most once and so is matched at most once for each
colour. We claim that the worst case running time is
for |Y | = |V |. Now, due to lines 9-10 we have |S| +
β(ij , c) − β(ij , c′) ≤ |Y ′| = O(n), so G′ at line 11 has
O(nm) nodes, O(n ·nm) edges and one matching takes
O(√nm · n2m) time. ✷
Similarly Algorithm 6 solves the ∀NE problem.
Algorithm 6: Algorithm for ∀NE on unweighted
DAGs with out-degree ≤ 1.
Input: A coordination game G((V,E), C, β) and
query q : Q→M .
Output: YES if all Nash equilibria are consistent
with q and NO otherwise.
1 Topologically sort V into a sequence (i1, . . . , in).
2 for j := 1 . . . n do
3 X(ij) := the set of colours player ij can play in
any Nash equilibrium (lines 3-13 of Algorithm
5)
4 if ij ∈ Q and X(ij) 6= {q(ij)} then
5 return NO
6 return YES
Theorem 9 Algorithm 6 solves the ∀NE problem for
DAGs with out-degree at most one in O(|G|2.5) time.
7 Conclusions
We presented a simple class of coordination games on
directed graphs. We focused on checking whether a
given partial colouring of a subset of the nodes is con-
sistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alterna-
tively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We showed these
problems to be NP-complete and coNP-complete, re-
spectively, in general. However, we also identified sev-
eral natural cases when these decision problems are
tractable.
In the case of weighted DAGs with out-degree at
most one and colour complete graphs with no bonuses
a simple reduction from the Partition problem and
its complement, shows NP and coNP-hardness of their
∃NE and ∀NE problems, respectively. This does not ex-
clude the possibility that pseudo-polynomial algorithms
exist for these problems. We conjecture that even for
unweighted colour complete graphs these problems are
NP/coNP-hard in the presence of bonuses or when the
set of colours, M , is not fixed.
There are several ways our results can be extended
further. One is to study other constraints, e.g. unique-
ness of Nash equilibrium or checking maximum payoff
for a given player. Another is to look at different solu-
tion concepts, e.g. strong equilibria. And yet another is
to look for more classes of graphs that can be analysed
in polynomial time. Given that these decision problems
are already computationally hard for DAGs with three
colours, the possibilities for such new classes are rather
limited.
Finally, we only focused on pure Nash equilibria in
this paper, which may not exist for general graphs.
On the other hand, mixed Nash equilibria always ex-
ist due to Nash’s theorem. It would be interesting to
know whether the complexity of finding one is PPAD-
complete problem just like it is for general polymatrix
games (Cai and Daskalakis 2011).
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{a}{a, b}{b}
Figure 4: A graph which is colour complete, but is not
a complete graph (a clique).
Appendix
A Full algorithms
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for ∀NE on arbi-
trary graphs with two colours and monochromatic
queries.
Input: A coordination game G((V,E), w, C, β) and
monochromatic query q : Q→M .
Output: YES if all Nash equilibria are consistent
with q and NO otherwise.
1 for i ∈ V do
2 if 1 ∈ C(i) then s(i) = 1 else s(i) = 0
3 set S := {i | s(i) = 0}
4 while S 6= ∅ do
5 remove any element from S and assign it to i
6 for {j ∈ V | i→ j ∈ E} do
7 if s(j) = 1 and 0 ∈ C(j) and
pj((0, s−j)) > pj(s) then
8 s(j) = 0
9 add j to S
10 if ∀i∈Q s(i) = 0 return YES else return NO
B Full proofs of lemmas and theorems
Theorem 1 The ∃NE problem for coordination games
with two colours and monochromatic queries can be
solved in O(|G|) time using Algorithm 1.
Proof. We show that Algorithm 1 solves the ∃NE
problem and that its running time is O(|G|). Let 
be a partial order on all joint strategies s : V → M
defined as follows: s  s′ iff for all i ∈ V , s(i) ≤ s′(i).
Let s0 denote the value of s once line 3 is reached. The
colouring s0 may not be a Nash equilibrium, so Algo-
rithm 1 tries to correct this with the minimum number
of switches from 0 to 1. Note that for any colouring s
we have s0  s. Note that lines 3-9 of Algorithm 1 can
be seen as a function F : (V → M) → (V → M) from
the initial colouring, in this case s0, to a new colouring,
F (s0). Note that F is monotonic according to , i.e. if
s  s′ then F (s)  F (s′). This is simply because the
more colour 1 is used initially, the more players would
like to switch to it. Also, any Nash equilibrium is a
fixed point of F , because no player would like to switch
at line 7. We now need the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For every joint strategy s, F (s) is a Nash
equilibrium.
Algorithm 6: Algorithm for ∀NE on unweighted
DAGs with out-degree ≤ 1.
Input: A coordination game G((V,E), C, β) and
query q : Q→M
Output: YES if all Nash equilibria are consistent
with q and NO otherwise.
1 Topologically sort V into a sequence (i1, . . . , in).
2 for j := 1 . . . n do
3 X(ij) := ∅
4 Y := {X(k) | k → ij ∈ E}
5 for c ∈ C(ij) do
6 S := {Z ∈ Y | c ∈ Z}; C′ := C \ {c};
Y ′ := Y \ S;
7 if exists c′ ∈ C′ such that
|S|+ β(ij , c)− β(ij , c′) < 0 then
8 continue with the next c
9 while exists c′ ∈ C′ such that
|S|+ β(ij , c)− β(ij , c′) ≥ |Y ′| do
10 C′ := C′ \ {c′};
Y ′ := Y ′ \ {Z ∈ Y ′ | c′ ∈ Z}
11 Construct the following bipartite graph
G′ := (V ′ = (Y ′, {{c′} × {1, . . . , |S|+
β(ij , c)− β(ij , c′)} | c′ ∈ C′}), E′)
where Z → (c′, x) ∈ E′ iff c′ ∈ Z12
if the maximum bipartite matching in G′
has size |Y ′| then
13 add c to X(ij)
14 if ij ∈ Q and X(ij) 6= {q(ij)} then
15 return NO
16 return YES
Algorithm 7: Algorithm for ∀NE on an unweighted
simple cycle.
Input: A simple cycle on nodes
V = {0, . . . , n− 1}, sets Ai, Bi, Ci for
i ∈ V , and a query q : Q→M .
Output: YES if all NEs are consistent with q and
NO otherwise or if no NE exists.
1 Let X0 = {q(0)}.
2 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
3 if Xi 6⊆ Bi⊕1 then
4 Xi⊕1 = (Xi ∩ Ci⊕1) ∪Ai⊕1
5 else
6 Xi⊕1 = Xi
7 if i⊕ 1 ∈ Q then
8 if {q(i⊕ 1)} 6= Xi⊕1 then
9 return NO
10 return YES
Proof. Every node with colour 1 in F (s) is added
to the set S at most once: either at the beginning or
when it switches from 0 to 1. If a node does not have
a predecessor with colour 1, it cannot possibly have an
incentive to switch to 1, because this would give him
reward 0. Every time a predecessor of a node switches
to 1, we consider that node in line 7 and whether it is
beneficial for it to switch to 1. If at no point it was,
then colour 0 has to be this player’s best response in
F (s). Also, no player can have an incentive to switch
back from 1 to 0 because the payoff for choosing 1 is
weakly increasing for every player after each strategy
update. ✷
Now, if Algorithm 1 returns YES, then the correct-
ness follows from Lemma 5. Since in this case, F (s0)
is consistent with q and by Lemma 5 it is a Nash equi-
librium. Conversely, if Algorithm 1 returns NO then
there exists i ∈ Q such that F (s0)(i) = 1. Suppose
there is a Nash equilibrium s′ consistent with q. Then
s0  s′ and F (s0)  F (s′) = s′, but s′(i) = q(i) = 0; a
contradiction.
To analyse its computational complexity, note that
each node can be added to the set S at most once, be-
cause the colour of each node changes at most once and
so each edge is considered at most once as well. More-
over, we can compute pj((1, s−j)) and pj(s) in constant
time, by storing for each node the sum of weights of
edges from neighbours with colour 1. Every time the
colour of a node j changes in line 8, for any neighbour
i of j we add the weight of the edge leading from j to i
to the stored value for node i; we need to make such an
update O(e) times in total. Thus the total complexity
of this algorithm is O(n+ e). ✷
Theorem 2 The ∀NE problem for coordination games
with two colours and monochromatic queries can be
solved in O(|G|) time using Algorithm 2.
Proof. Let s0 be the joint strategy defined by lines
1–2 in Algorithm 2. By an argument very similar to
the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that F (s0) is a
Nash equilibrium. If Algorithm 2 returns NO then there
exists a j ∈ Q such that F (s0)(j) 6= q(j). Therefore,
F (s0) is a Nash equilibrium which is not consistent with
q.
To show the converse, as in the proof of Theorem 1,
we define a partial order  on joint strategies as be-
fore. Note that for any joint strategy s we have s  s0.
Again, note that lines 3–9 of Algorithm 2 define a func-
tion F : (V → M) → (V → M) which satisfies the
property: if s  s′ then F (s)  F (s′).
Now suppose that Algorithm 2 returns YES then for
all i ∈ Q: F (s0)(i) = 0. We need to prove that every
Nash equilibrium is consistent with q. Suppose this
is not the case, then there exists a Nash equilibrium
s′ and a node j ∈ Q such that s′(j) 6= q(j). By our
assumption, this implies that s′(j) = 1. We have s′ 
s0 and therefore s
′ = F (s′)  F (s0). From s′(j) = 1
and F (s0)(j) = 0 we get a contradiction.
The time complexity analysis of Algorithm 2 is the
same as that of Algorithm 1. ✷
Corollary 1 The ∀NE problem for coordination games
with two colours and polychromatic queries can be
solved in O(|G|) time.
Proof. Let q : Q → M be a polychromatic query.
Define P0 and P1 to be the sets of players asked to pick
0 and 1, respectively, by q. Formally, P0 = {i ∈ Q |
q(i) = 0} and P1 = {i ∈ Q | q(i) = 1}. Let q0 =
q|P0 and q1 = q|P1 . It can be verified that every Nash
equilibria is consistent with q iff every Nash equilibria is
consistent with q0 and q1. Note that both q0 and q1 are
monochromatic queries and therefore, by Theorem 2,
both of them can be answered in O(|G|) time. Thus
the claim follows. ✷
Proposition 1 For any Nash equilibrium s in
D(X1, . . . , Xk, x;Y ) from Figure 2: (a) s(Y ) = x iff
∃i s(Xi) = x and (b) s(Y ) = ¬x iff ∀i s(Xi) = ¬x.
Proof. (a) If ∃i s(Xi) = x then player Y ’s payoff for
picking x is at least k and for ¬x is at most k, so it has
to be s(Y ) = x. On the other hand, if ∀i s(Xi) 6= x
then player Y ’s payoff for picking x is k − 1 and for
picking ¬x is k, so it has to be s(Y ) 6= x.
(b) If ∀i s(Xi) = ¬x then player Y ’s payoff for picking
x is k−1 and for ¬x is k, so it has to be s(Y ) = ¬x. On
the other hand, if ∃i s(Xi) 6= x then player Y ’s payoff
for picking x is at least k and for picking ¬x is at most
k − 1, so it has to be s(Y ) 6= x. ✷
Theorem 3 The ∀NE problem for singleton queries is
coNP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours
and no bonuses.
Proof. To prove coNP-hardness we provide a reduc-
tion from the tautology problem for formulae in 3-DNF
form, which is coNP-complete. Assume we are given a
3-DNF formula
φ = (a1 ∧ b1 ∧ c1) ∨ (a2 ∧ b2 ∧ c2) ∨ . . . ∨ (ak ∧ bk ∧ ck)
with k clauses and n propositional variables x1, . . . , xn,
where each ai, bi, ci is a literal equal to xj or ¬xj for
some j. We will construct a coordination game Gφ of
sizeO(n+k) such that a particular singleton ∀NE query
is true for Gφ iff φ evaluates to true for all truth assign-
ments.
First for every propositional variable xi there are four
nodes Xi, ¬Xi, Li, Li in Gφ, each with two possible
colours ⊤ or ⊥. We connect these four nodes using
gadgets D(Xi,¬Xi,⊤;Li) and D(Xi,¬Xi,⊥;Li). This
makes sure that in any Nash equilibrium, s, we have
s(Li) = ⊤ and s(Li) = ⊥ iff Xi and ¬Xi are assigned
different colours.
Next, for every clause (ai ∨ bi ∨ ci) in φ we add
to the game graph Gφ node Ci. We use gad-
get D(ai, bi, ci,⊥;Ci) to connect literals with clauses,
where we identify each xi with Xi and each ¬xi with
¬Xi. Note that Proposition 1 implies that the colour
of Ci is ⊤ iff all nodes ai, bi, ci are assigned ⊤.
We add two nodes T and F to gather colours ⊤ and
⊥ from the Li and Li nodes. Also, we add an addi-
tional node Φ to gather the values of all the clauses.
We connect these using gadgets D(L1, . . . , Ln,⊥;T ),
D(L1, . . . , Ln,⊤;F ), and D(C1, . . . , Ck,⊤; Φ). The
first two gadgets guarantee that if in a Nash equilib-
rium s the colour of T is ⊤ and the colour of F is ⊥
then s corresponds to a valid truth assignment. The
last gadget guarantees that the colour of Φ is ⊤ iff at
least one of Ci-s has colour ⊤.
Now, we need to express that for every Nash equi-
librium s: s(T ) = ⊤ and s(F ) = ⊥ implies that
s(Φ) = ⊤. We will use gadget from Figure 3. It consists
of the three nodes T, F,Φ that we already defined in Gφ
and several additional ones. We claim that ∀NE query
q(Z) = ⋆ is true for Gφ iff Φ is a tautology. However,
equivalently, we will prove that ∀NE query q(Z) = ⋆ is
false for Gφ iff φ is not a tautology.
(⇒) Let s be a Nash equilibrium which does not satisfy
query q(Z) = ⋆, which essentially means that s(Z) =
⊥. We will show that the following truth assignment
ν(xi) = s(Xi) makes φ false. Looking at the gadget in
Figure 3 we can easily deduce that all nodes W,X, Y
are assigned ⊥ in s, because otherwise Z would have an
incentive to switch to ⋆. This means that it has to be
s(X) = s(Φ) = ⊥, and s(U) = ⊤ so s(T ) = ⊤. Next,
s(T ) = ⊤ implies that s(Li) = ⊤ for all i and s(F ) = ⊥
implies that s(Li) = ⊥ for all i, so s(¬Xi) = ¬s(Xi)
for all i. Finally, s(Φ) = ⊥ implies that s(Ci) = ⊥ for
all i, but then ν makes every clause in φ false, and so
also makes the whole formula φ false.
(⇐) Let ν : {x1, . . . , xn} → {⊤,⊥} be a truth as-
signment that makes φ false. We form the following
Nash equilibrium, s, by first setting s(Xi) = ν(xi)
and s(¬Xi) = ¬ν(xi) for all i. Note that this makes
the best response of nodes Li to be ⊤ and of nodes
Li to be ⊥. It follows that the best responses of T
and F are ⊤ and ⊥, respectively. On the other hand,
since ν makes φ false, all clauses C1, . . . , Cn in φ are
false, and so for all i: s(Ci) = ⊥ is Ci’s best re-
sponse. Finally, the best response of node Φ is ⊥.
Looking at the gadget in Figure 3, given the values
s(T ) = ⊤, s(F ) = s(Φ) = ⊥, one can easily see that
s(U) = ⊤, s(W ) = s(X) = s(y) = s(Z) = ⊥ are these
nodes best responses. Therefore, s is a Nash equilib-
rium which does not satisfy query q(Z) = ⋆. ✷
Theorem 4 The ∃NE problem is NP-complete for un-
weighted DAGs with two colours and no bonuses.
Proof. To prove NP-hardness we provide a reduc-
tion from the 3-SAT problem, which is NP-complete.
Assume we are given a 3-SAT formula
φ = (a1 ∨ b1 ∨ c1) ∧ (a2 ∨ b2 ∨ c2) ∧ . . . ∧ (ak ∨ bk ∨ ck)
with k clauses and n propositional variables x1, . . . , xn,
where each ai, bi, ci is a literal equal to xj or ¬xj for
some j. We will construct a coordination game Gφ of
size O(n+ k) such that a particular ∃NE query is true
for Gφ iff φ is satisfiable.
First, for every propositional variable xi there are
four nodes Xi, ¬Xi, Li, Li in Gφ, each with two pos-
sible colours ⊤ or ⊥. Intuitively, for a given truth as-
signment, if xi is true then ⊤ should be chosen for Xi
and ⊥ should be chosen for ¬Xi, and the other way
around if xi is false. To select only the Nash equilibria
which correspond to valid truth assignments we make
use of the gadget D presented in Figure 2. We connect
these four nodes using gadgets D(Xi,¬Xi,⊤;Li) and
D(Xi,¬Xi,⊥;Li). This make sure that in any Nash
equilibrium, s, we have s(Li) = ⊤ and s(Li) = ⊥ iff
Xi and ¬Xi are assigned different colours. This is be-
cause from Proposition 1 it follows that if s(Li) = ⊤
then ⊤ is assigned to at least one of Xi,¬Xi and if
s(Li) = ⊥ then ⊥ is assigned to at least one of them as
well. So necessarily, ⊤ and ⊥ are assigned to exactly
one of them.
Next, for every clause (ai ∨ bi ∨ ci) in φ we add
to the game graph Gφ node Ci. We use gad-
get D(ai, bi, ci,⊤;Ci) to connect literals with clauses,
where we identify each xi with Xi and each ¬xi with
¬Xi. Note that Proposition 1 implies that s(Ci) = ⊤
iff at least one of nodes ai, bi, ci is assigned ⊤.
Finally, we have two nodes T and F which
gather all nodes whose colours should be ⊤
and ⊥, respectively. We connect these us-
ing gadgets D(L1, . . . , Ln, C1, . . . , Ck,⊥;T ) and
D(L1, . . . , Ln,⊤;F ).
We claim that ∃NE query q(T ) = ⊤, q(F ) = ⊥ is true
for Gφ iff φ is satisfiable.
(⇒) Assume that s is a Nash equilibrium consistent
with q in the game Gφ. We claim that the truth assign-
ment ν : {x1, . . . , xn} → {⊤,⊥} that assigns ν(xi) = ⊤
iff s(Xi) = ⊤, and ν(xi) = ⊥ iff s(¬Xi) = ⊤, makes φ
true.
Since s is a Nash equilibrium and s(T ) = ⊤, Proposi-
tion 1 implies that all Li-s and Ci-s are assigned colour
⊤. Similarly, s(F ) = ⊥ implies that all Li-s are as-
signed colour ⊥. But this means that the assignment
of the colours to Xi-s and ¬Xi-s corresponds to a valid
truth assignment. Furthermore, for any i ∈ {1, . . ., k}:
s(Ci) = ⊤ implies that at least one of the literals ai,
bi, ci is assigned ⊤. Therefore ν makes every clause Ci
true and so the whole formula φ true as well.
(⇐) Assume φ is satisfiable. Take a truth assignment
ν : {x1, . . . , xn} → {⊤,⊥} that makes φ true. We will
construct a Nash equilibrium s consistent with q. For all
j, if ν(xj) is true then assign s(Xi) = ⊤, s(¬Xi) = ⊥,
and if ν(xj) is false then assign s(Xi) = ⊥, s(¬Xi) = ⊤.
It follows that if we assign s(Li) = ⊤, s(Li) = ⊤ for all
i = 1, . . . , n then Li and Li have no incentive to switch.
Furthermore, because ν makes every clause Ci true, ⊤
is assigned in s to at least one of the nodes ai, bi, ci, so
if we set s(Ci) = ⊤ for all i = 1, . . . , k, then no Ci has
an incentive to switch. Finally, setting s(T ) = ⊤ and
s(F ) = ⊥, makes s consistent with q and neither T nor
F has an incentive to switch. ✷
{⊥}
T
{⊤,⊥} {⋆}
F
{⊤,⊥} {⊤}
X
{⊥, ⋆}
{⊤}
Y
{⊤, ⋆}
Z
{⊤, ⋆}
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Figure 5: Gadget used in the NP-hardness proof of
∃NE. Note that there is one edge with weight 2, which
can be easily simulated by unweighted edges.
Corollary 2 The ∃NE problem for singleton queries is
NP-complete for unweighted DAGs with three colours
and no bonuses.
Proof. To prove NP-hardness we again reduce from
the 3-SAT problem. Assume we are given a 3-SAT for-
mula φ. In Theorem 4 we constructed a game Gφ for
which φ is satisfiable iff ∃NE query q(T ) = ⊤, q(F ) = ⊥
is true for Gφ, where T and F are two nodes of Gφ. We
now combine this reduction with the gadget depicted
in Figure 2, which consists of several nodes including
nodes T and F from Gφ, to form a new game G′φ. We
claim that a singleton query q(Z) = ⋆ is true in G′φ iff
φ is satisfiable.
(⇒) Let s be a Nash equilibrium satisfying s(Z) = ⋆.
Notice that based on the structure of the gadget, s(Z) =
⋆ implies that s(X) = s(Y ) = ⋆, which implies that
s(T ) = ⊤ and s(F ) = ⊥. We already know that this
implies that φ is satisfiable.
(⇐) If φ is satisfiable then there exists a Nash equilib-
rium s in Gφ such that s(T ) = ⊤ and s(F ) = ⊥. Notice
that s can easily be extended to a Nash equilibrium s′
in G′φ by setting s′(X) = s′(Y ) = s′(Z) = ⋆, which is
consistent with the query q. ✷
Theorem 5 The ∃NE problem for simple cycles can be
solved in O(|G|) time.
Proof. We show that given a simple cycle over the
nodes V = {0, . . . , n− 1} and a query q : Q → M , the
output of Algorithm 3 is YES iff there exists a Nash
equilibrium s∗ which is consistent with q.
Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗ which is
consistent with q. We can argue by induction on n
that on termination of Algorithm 3, for all i ≤ n, we
have s∗(i) ∈ Xi, which in turn implies that the output
of Algorithm 3 is YES. Since s∗ is consistent with q,
we have s∗(0) = q(0) and by line 1 of Algorithm 3,
X0 = {s∗(0)}. Assume that we have s∗(i) ∈ Xi and
consider the iteration of the loop in line 2 of Algorithm
3 for i⊕ 1. We have the following cases.
If Xi ⊆ Bi⊕1 then s∗(i) ∈ Bi⊕1, by the definition
of Bi⊕1 and the fact that s
∗ is a Nash equilibrium, we
have that s∗(i⊕1) = s∗(i). This is because s∗(i) strictly
dominates any other strategy choice for node i⊕ 1. By
line 6 in Algorithm 3, we haveXi⊕1 = Xi and therefore,
s∗(i⊕ 1) ∈ Xi⊕1.
If Xi 6⊆ Bi⊕1 and s∗(i ⊕ 1) ∈ Ai⊕1 then by line 4
of Algorithm 3, we have s∗(i ⊕ 1) ∈ Xi⊕1. If s∗(i ⊕
1) 6∈ Ai⊕1, then since s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, s∗(i ⊕
1) = s∗(i) and s∗(i ⊕ 1) ∈ Ci⊕1 (otherwise node i ⊕ 1
would have a profitable deviation to a strategy in Ai⊕1).
Therefore, by line 4 of Algorithm 3, we have s∗(i⊕1) ∈
Xi ∩ Ci⊕1 ⊆ Xi⊕1.
Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 3 is
YES. From the definition, this implies that for all i ∈ V ,
Xi 6= ∅ and for all j ∈ Q: q(j) ∈ Xj (in fact,
Xj = {q(j)}). We define a Nash equilibrium s∗ as fol-
lows. First, let s∗(0) = q(0). Next we assign values to
s∗(i) starting at i = n − 1 and going down to i = 1 as
described below.
• If i ∈ Q then s∗(i) = q(i).
• If i 6∈ Q and Xi ⊆ Bi⊕1 then by Algorithm 3 we have
Xi⊕1 = Xi. Let s
∗(i) = s∗(i⊕ 1).
• Assume i 6∈ Q andXi 6⊆ Bi⊕1. If s∗(i⊕1) ∈ Xi∩Ci⊕1
set s∗(i) = s∗(i⊕ 1). Otherwise s∗(i⊕ 1) ∈ Ai⊕1 and
we set s∗(i) to any element in Xi \Bi⊕1.
It is straightforward to verify that for the joint strat-
egy s∗ defined as above, for all i ∈ V , s∗(i) ∈ Xi. We
now argue that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose not,
then there exists j ∈ V and a strategy x ∈ C(j) such
that pj(x, s
∗
−j) > pj(s
∗). We have the following cases.
Case j 6∈ Q. If Xj⊖1 ⊆ Bj then by the definition of
s∗, we have s∗(j) = s∗(j ⊖ 1) and so x 6= s∗(j ⊖ 1).
By the definition of Bj and Xj⊖1, we have that for all
strategies y ∈ C(j): β(j, s∗(j)) +wj⊖1→j − 1 ≥ β(j, y).
Now, we have that pj(s
∗) = β(j, s∗(j)) + wj⊖1→j ≥
β(j, x) + 1 > pj(x, s
∗
−j) which is a contradiction.
If Xj⊖1 6⊆ Bj and s∗(j) ∈ Xj⊖1 ∩ Cj then by the
definition of s∗ we have s∗(j) = s∗(j ⊖ 1), and so
x 6= s∗(j ⊖ 1). By the definition of Cj , we have that
pj(s
∗) = β(j, s∗(j)) + wj⊖1→j ≥ β(j, x) = pj(x, s∗−j); a
contradiction.
If Xj⊖1 6⊆ Bj and s∗(j) 6∈ Xj⊖1 ∩ Cj then by the
definition of s∗, we have s∗(j) ∈ Aj and s∗(j⊖ 1) 6∈ Bj .
From the former, β(j, s∗(j)) ≥ β(j, y) for all strate-
gies y. From the latter, it follows that β(j, x) ≤
β(j, s∗(j)) + wj⊖1→j , because all bonuses are integers.
Thus pj(s
∗) = β(j, s∗(j)) ≥ pj(y, s∗−j) for all y ∈ C(j);
a contradiction.
Case j ∈ Q. Consider the value of Xj in line 7 of Algo-
rithm 3 during the iteration when i = j ⊖ 1. Since the
output of Algorithm 3 is assumed to be YES, we have
that q(j) ∈ Xj . Now applying a similar case analysis
as above, we can argue that node j does not have a
profitable deviation from s∗. ✷
Theorem 6 The ∀NE problem for simple cycles (un-
weighted simple cycles) can be solved in O(m|G|) time
(respectively, O(|G|) time using Algorithm 7 in the ap-
pendix).
Proof. We first show that in the special case of un-
weighted simple cycles, for which Nash equilibrium al-
ways exists, Algorithm 7 solves the ∀NE problem for un-
weighted simple cycles in O(|G|) time. In other words,
we argue that given an unweighted simple cycle over
the nodes V = {0, . . . , n − 1} and a query q : Q → C,
the output of Algorithm 7 is YES iff for every Nash
equilibrium s∗, the joint strategy s∗ is consistent with
q.
Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗ which is
not consistent with q. For the sake of simplicity, as-
sume that s∗(0) = q(0) and let j be the minimal index
such that s∗(j) 6= q(j). By induction we argue that
if Algorithm 7 does not terminate with an output NO
before the iteration with i = j ⊖ 1, then for all k such
that 0 ≤ k ≤ j: s∗(k) ∈ Xk. Since s∗(0) = q(0), line 1
of Algorithm 7 implies X0 = {s∗(0)}. Assume that we
have s∗(i) ∈ Xi (for i < j) and consider the iteration
of the loop in line 2 of Algorithm 7 for i⊕ 1. We have
the following cases.
If Xi ⊆ Bi⊕1 then s∗(i) ∈ Bi⊕1, by the definition
of Bi⊕1 and the fact that s
∗ is a Nash equilibrium, we
have that s∗(i⊕1) = s∗(i). This is because s∗(i) strictly
dominates any other strategy choice for node i⊕ 1. By
line 6 in Algorithm 7, we haveXi⊕1 = Xi and therefore,
s∗(i⊕ 1) ∈ Xi⊕1.
If Xi 6⊆ Bi⊕1 and s∗(i ⊕ 1) ∈ Ai⊕1 then by line 4 of
Algorithm 7, we have s∗(i ⊕ 1) ∈ Xi⊕1. If s∗(i ⊕ 1) 6∈
Ai⊕1, then since s
∗ is a Nash equilibrium, s∗(i ⊕ 1) =
s∗(i) and s∗(i⊕ 1) ∈ Ci⊕1 (otherwise node i⊕ 1 has a
profitable deviation to a strategy in Ai⊕1). Therefore,
by line 4 of Algorithm 7, we have s∗(i⊕1) ∈ Xi∩Ci⊕1 ⊆
Xi⊕1.
Now consider the iteration of Algorithm 7 when i =
j ⊖ 1. By the above argument, s∗(j) ∈ Xj and by
assumption s∗(j) 6= q(j). Therefore, the condition on
line 8 is satisfied and the output of the algorithm is NO.
Conversely, suppose the output of Algorithm 7 is NO.
Let j be the index such that the algorithm terminates
with i = j. This implies that j ∈ Q and {q(j)} 6=
Xj . Note that by definition, Xj 6= ∅. Define a partial
joint strategy s1 on the nodes {0, . . . , j} inductively as
follows. Let s1(0) = q(0) and s1(j) ∈ Xj \ {q(j)}. We
define s1(i) starting at i = j− 1 going down to i = 1 as
follows.
• If i ∈ Q then s1(i) = q(i).
• If i 6∈ Q and Xi ⊆ Bi⊕1 then by Algorithm 7 we have
Xi = Xi⊕1. Let s1(i) = s1(i⊕ 1).
• Assume i 6∈ Q andXi 6⊆ Bi⊕1. If s1(i⊕1) ∈ Xi∩Ci⊕1
we set s1(i) = s1(i ⊕ 1). Otherwise we have that
s1(i ⊕ 1) ∈ Ai⊕1 and we set s1(i) to any element in
Xi \Bi⊕1.
We can then extend s1 to a joint strategy s2 by al-
lowing nodes j + 1, j + 2, . . . n − 1 to switch, in this
order, to their best response strategies. Note that this
is well defined since the best response of a node i de-
pends only on the strategy of its unique predecessor
i ⊖ 1 on the cycle. If s2 is a Nash equilibrium then
we have a joint strategy which is not consistent with
q. If s2 is not a Nash equilibrium then we can argue
that node 0 is not playing its best response in s2. Let
node 0 switch to its best response, denoted by x. By
definition of s1: x 6= q(0). Now by applying the best
response improvement to each node successively in the
order 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 we can show it is possible to con-
struct a joint strategy s3 which is a Nash equilibrium
in which s3(0) = x. Details of this construction can be
found in (Apt, Simon, and Wojtczak 2016, Lemma 6).
Thus it follows that s3 is a Nash equilibrium which is
not consistent with q.
Finally, we show that Algorithm 4 solves the ∀NE
problem in O(m|G|) time for weighted simple cycles.
First, suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗ which
is not consistent with a ∀NE query q : Q → M . Con-
sider the iteration of the main loop of Algorithm 4 for
c = s∗(0). Note that Algorithm 3 for q′(0) = s∗(0)
would return YES, because s∗ is consistent with q′.
From the proof of Theorem 5 we know that, for ev-
ery i ∈ V , the set Xi this algorithm computes is equal
to the set of colours node i can have in any Nash equi-
librium consistent with q′. Note that there has to be
i∗ ∈ Q such that q(i∗) 6= s∗(i∗) ∈ X(i∗), because s∗ is
not consistent with q. Thus Algorithm 4 returns NO,
because Xi∗ 6= {q(i∗)}.
Conversely, suppose Algorithm 4 returns NO for a
query q. Then, there exists i∗ ∈ Q for which Xi∗ com-
puted by Algorithm 4 is 6= {q(i∗)}. Let us pick any
x ∈ Xi∗ \ {q(i∗)}. Based on the interpretation of the
set X(i∗), there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗ such that
s∗(i∗) = x. Such s∗ would not be consistent with q,
which concludes the proof. ✷
Lemma 1 The relation ≻s is acyclic, i.e. for all k ≥
2 there is no sequence of colours x1, . . . , xk such that
x1 ≻s x2 ≻s . . . ≻s xk ≻s x1.
Proof. Suppose there is such a sequence. From the
definition of ≻s there exist players i1, . . . , ik such that
{xj, xj+1} ⊆ C(ij) and s(ij) = xj for all j = 1, . . . , k
(where we identify xk+1 with x1). For a joint strategy
s and colour c ∈ M , let #c(s) denote the number of
players who chose colour c in s, i.e. #c(s) = |{v ∈
V |s(v) = c}|. Note that for all j player ij ’s payoff in s is
#xj(s)−1 and switching to xj+1 would give him payoff
#xj+1(s). Therefore, #xj(s) − 1 ≥ #xj+1(s), because
otherwise s would not be a Nash equilibrium. However,
this implies #x1(s)− k ≥ #x1(s); a contradiction. ✷
Lemma 2 Any acyclic binary relation on a finite set
can be extended to a total oder.
Proof. Let ≻ be an acyclic relation on a finite set
S and k = |S|. The directed graph defined by G =
(S,≻) is a DAG, because ≻ is acyclic. Therefore we can
topologically sort all the elements in S into a sequence
x1, . . . , xk in such a way that xi ≻ xj implies i ≤ j.
Notice that a relation ≻∗ defined as xi ≻∗ xj iff i ≤ j
is a total order on S. ✷
Lemma 3 For any Nash equilibrium s, SP(∗s) = s.
Proof. Suppose that SP(∗s)(i) 6= s(i) for some
player i. This means s(i) 6= max∗s C(i), so there exists
x ∈ C(i) such that x ∗s s(i) and x 6= s(i). How-
ever, {x, s(i)} ⊆ C(i) implies that s(i) ≻ x and so also
s(i) ∗s x should hold; a contradiction with the fact
that ∗s, as a total order, is antisymmetric. ✷
Example 2 Let the set of colours M be {1, . . . ,m} and
consider a clique consisting of (m−1)m/2 players. For
every x, y ∈ M such that x < y there is exactly one
player in this clique whose available colours are x and
y only. It is easy to see that for the total order  defined
as m  m− 1  . . .  1 the number of players choosing
colour m in SP() is m − 1, which is the maximum
possible. It can be verified that in SP(), all the players
who picked colour x receive a payoff of x−2, each colour
gives a different payoff and no player can improve his
payoff. It follows that SP() is a Nash equilibrium. If
we consider any other total order on M , it will result in
a permutation of this sequence of payoffs. Because all
of these numbers are different, no two joint strategies
induced by two different total orders are the same.
Lemma 4 If Algorithm 5 returns YES, then for all i ∈
V , for all c ∈ X(i), there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗
such that s∗i = c and for all j 6= i, s∗j ∈ X(j).
Proof. Let θ = (i1, . . . , in) be the topological ordering
of V chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 5. We show that for
all j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, for all c ∈ X(ij), there exists a Nash
equilibrium s∗ such that s∗(ij) = c and for all k 6= j,
s∗(ik) ∈ X(ik). For i ∈ V , let Ai = {c ∈ C(i) | β(i, c) ≥
β(i, c′) for all c′ ∈ C(i)} be the set of colours available
to player i with the maximum bonus.
Let ij be a node such that Nij = ∅. In the iteration of
the algorithm which considers node ij, we have Y
′ = ∅
every colour which does not belong to A(ij) is removed
in line 10. Thus X(ij) = A(ij). Let D = {ik ∈ V |
Nik = ∅}. Consider the partial joint strategy s′ : D →
C defined as s′(ij) = c and for ik ∈ D such that ik 6= ij
let s′(ik) ∈ A(ik). Now s′ can be extended to a joint
strategy s∗ : V → C by successively making each node
(according to the ordering θ) choose its best response.
Since G is a DAG, it easily follows that s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium and for all ik, s
∗(ik) ∈ X(ik).
Now consider a node im such that Nim 6= ∅ and
let c ∈ X(im). Let D = {im} ∪ {ij ∈ V |
there is a path from ij to im in G}. By definition, for
all ij in D, we have j ≤ m (according to the ordering θ).
Consider the partial joint strategy s′ : D → C defined
inductively as follows. Let s′(im) = c. Suppose that
s′(ij) is already defined for some ij ∈ D, then for each
ik ∈ Nij we do the following. If s′(ij) ∈ X(ik) then
let s′(ik) = s
′(ij). If s
′(ij) 6∈ X(ik), then consider the
iteration of Algorithm 5, which adds s′(ij) to X(ij). If
X(ik) is removed from Y
′ in line 10 because of colour
c′ then let s′(ik) = c
′. Otherwise, if the corresponding
maximum bipartite matching in line 12 matches X(ik)
with (c′, x), then define s′(ik) = c
′. Since the out-degree
of G is at most 1, s′(ik) is assigned a value exactly once
and so s′ is a valid function.
By definition of s′, for all ij ∈ D, s′(ij) ∈ X(ij).
Given a node j ∈ D, a partial joint strategy s : D → C
and c ∈ C(j), let Nj(s, c) = {k ∈ Nj | s(k) = c}. We
now argue that for all ij ∈ D, s′(ij) is a best response
for node ij to s
′
−ij
.
Suppose Nij = ∅. Since s′(ij) ∈ A(ij), it follows
that s′(ij) is a best response to s
′
−ij
. Now suppose
Nij 6= ∅ and s′(ij) is not a best response to s′−ij .
Then there exists a c′ ∈ C(ij) such that pij (c′, s′−ij ) >
pij (s
′). This implies that |Nij (s′, c′)| + β(ij , c′) >
|Nij (s′, s′(ij))| + β(ij , s′(ij)). Consider the iteration
of Algorithm 5 in which s′(ij) is added to X(ij). By
the definition of s′ and Algorithm 5, in this iteration,
|S| = |Nij (s′, s′(ij))|. If c′ is removed from C′ in
line 10 then we would have pij (s
′) = |Nij (s′, s′(ij))| +
β(ij , s
′(ij)) = |S| + β(ij , s′(ij)) ≥ |Y ′| + β(ij , c′) ≥
|Nij (s′, c′)|+β(ij , c′) = pij (s′); a contradiction. There-
fore for the bipartite graph G′ constructed in line 11 we
need to have Nij (s
′, c′) ∈ Y ′. Notice that every node in
Y ′ is matched with some other node in line 12, because
the size of the matching is |Y ′|. Again, by the defini-
tion of s′, for all nodes ik ∈ Nij (s′, c′) the node X(ik)
would need to be matched with (c′, x) for some 1 ≤ x ≤
|S|+ β(ij , s′(ij))− β(ij , c′). But this is impossible, be-
cause |Nij (s′, c′)| > |S|+β(ij , s′(ij))−β(ij , c′), thereby
contradicting the assumption that s′(ij) ∈ X(ij).
As in the earlier case, s′ can now be extended to
a joint strategy s∗ : V → C. First, for all j ∈ {i |
Ni = ∅} \D, set s′(j) ∈ A(j). Then successively make
each node according to the ordering θ choose its best
response. The resulting joint strategy s∗ is a Nash equi-
librium. ✷
Theorem 8 Algorithm 5 solves the ∃NE problem for
unweighted DAGs with out-degree at most one in
O(|G|2.5) time.
Proof. We show that given an unweighted DAG
G = (V,E) with out-degree at most 1 and a query q,
Algorithm 5 returns YES iff there exists a Nash equi-
librium s∗ which is consistent with q.
Suppose Algorithm 5 returns YES. Then from the
definition, for all i ∈ V , Xi 6= ∅ and for all j ∈ P ,
Xj = {q(j)}. By Lemma 4 it follows that there exists
a Nash equilibrium s∗ which is consistent with q.
Conversely, suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium
s∗ which is consistent with q. Let θ = (i1, . . . , in) be the
topological ordering of V chosen in line 1 of Algorithm
5. We argue that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, s∗(ij) ∈ X(ij).
The claim follows easily for i1. Consider a node im and
suppose for all j < m, s∗(ij) ∈ X(ij). For c ∈ C,
let Nim(s
∗, c) = {ik ∈ Nim | s∗(ik) = c}. Since s∗
is a Nash equilibrium, s∗(im) is a best reponse to the
choices made by all nodes ik ∈ Nim . This implies that
for all c 6= s∗im , |Nim(s∗, c)|+β(ij , c) ≤ |Nim(s∗, s∗im)|+
β(ij , s
∗
im). This condition guarantees that Algorithm 5
will find a matching of size |Y ′| for G′ defined in line
11 and thus s∗(im) ∈ X(im).
The computational complexity of Algorithm 5 mainly
depends on the maximum matching algorithm in bi-
partite graphs used at line 11. There are several such
algorithms, each with a different computational com-
plexity. We can use the standard Hopcroft-Karp algo-
rithm which has complexity O(E√V ) where E is the
number of edges and V is the number of nodes in a
given bipartite graph. For l = 1, . . . , n, let Yl denote
the value of Y at line 4 of Algorithm 5 for j := l. Note
that all of these sets are disjoint, because each node is
a predecessor of at most one other node. Let f(x) be
the function that returns the maximum running time
of one iteration of the loop between lines 6-13 for a set
Y of size x. Note that for any j, this loop is executed
at most once for each colour. Consider the function
g(x) := f(x) − f(0); note that g(x) = O(f(x)). It is
easy to see that g(x) is increasing, convex (the com-
plexity of the matching problem is at least linear in x),
and g(0) = 0. We will show that such defined g is su-
peradditive, i.e. g(a) + g(b) ≤ g(a+ b) for any a, b ≥ 0.
Lemma 6 Any convex, increasing function h such that
h(0) = 0 is superadditive.
Proof. Consider any a, b ≥ 0 and the linear function
q(x) := x ·h(a+ b)/(a+ b), which is the line connecting
the (0, 0) and (a+b, h(a+b)) points on the curve defined
by function h. As h is convex we have that any point
along q(x) for x ∈ [0, a+ b] is at least as high as h(x).
In particular, q(a) ≥ h(a) and q(b) ≥ h(b). At the same
time h(a+ b) = q(a) + q(b), which concludes the proof.
✷
We now have that the total running time of Algo-
rithm 5 is O(m ·∑nj=1 f(|Yj |)) = O(m ·
∑n
j=1(g(|Yj |)+
f(0))) = O(m ·∑nj=1 g(|Yj |)) = O(m · g(
∑n
j=1 |Yj |)) =
O(m · f(|V |)), where the third equality holds because
g is superadditive. As a result, it suffices to estimate
the matching time for a graph G′ with |Y ′| = |V |. Due
to lines 9-10 we have |S| + β(ij , c) − β(ij , c′) ≤ |Y ′| =
O(n), For such a Y ′, the bipartite graph G′ at line 11
would have n+ nm = O(nm) nodes and n · nm = n2m
edges. The complexity of one matching for such a G′
is O(n2m√nm). This implies that the total running
time of Algorithm 5 is O((nm)5/2) = O(|G|5/2), be-
cause |G| = O(nm). ✷
Theorem 9 Algorithm 6 solves the ∀NE problem for
DAGs with out-degree at most one in O(|G|2.5) time.
Proof. [sketch] The proof is similar to that of Theo-
rem 8. Let θ = (i1, . . . , in) be the topological ordering
of V chosen in line 1 of Algorithm 6. First, we need
the following lemma which essentially follows from the
proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 7 For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, in the iteration of Al-
gorithm 6 for the node ij, consider the set X(ij) com-
puted in line 3 (lines 3-13 in the long version). For all
c ∈ X(ij), there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗ such that
s∗(ij) = c and for all k ≤ j, s∗(ik) ∈ X(ik).
Suppose the output of Algorithm 6 is NO. Let ij be
the node which is being processed when the algorithm
outputs NO. This implies that ij ∈ Q and there exists
a c 6= q(ij) such that c ∈ X(ij). From Lemma 7 there
exists a Nash equilibrium s∗ such that s∗(ij) = c. Thus
s∗ is a Nash equilibrium which is not consistent with q.
Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium s∗ which is not
consistent with q. Let ij be the first node in the order-
ing θ such that s∗(ij) 6= q(ij). We can argue that for
all k < j, s∗(ik) ∈ X(ik) and in the iteration of Algo-
rithm 6 for the node ij, at line 3, s
∗(ij) ∈ X(ij). This
implies that the condition on line 4 is satisfied and the
algorithm outputs NO. The bound on the running time
follows from the analysis given in the proof of Theo-
rem 8. ✷
